Harvard Corporate Governance

JUNE 2, 2023

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, June 2, 2023 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of May 26-June 1, 2023 Modernization of Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rule Proposal Posted by Jonathan H. Gaines, David S.

Equity 222

Equity 222

Harvard Corporate Governance

APRIL 11, 2022

They have now turned their attention to public reporting companies and are proposing regulatory changes to cyber incident reporting, cyber risk management and cyber governance. 1] Since then, there have been litigation releases that have also provided guidance to public companies on their cybersecurity disclosure controls and obligations. [2]

250

250

Harvard Corporate Governance

JUNE 16, 2023

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, June 16, 2023 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of June 9-15, 2023. Embracing Environmental Justice Initiatives to Advance Corporate Objectives Posted by Tatjana Vujic, Arie T. Simmerman, David J.

Treasury 185

Treasury Marketability 185

Harvard Corporate Governance

APRIL 5, 2024

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, April 5, 2024 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of March 29-April 4, 2024 Legal Risk and Insider Trading Posted by Marcin Kacperczyk (Imperial College London) and Emiliano S. Posted by Jill E.

Technology 100

Technology Marketability 100

Harvard Corporate Governance

JUNE 20, 2023

Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University; Patrick Bolton , the Barbara and David Zalaznick Professor Emeritus of Business at Columbia Business School, Marcin T. Halem is the Director of the Climate Center at Lazard Freres & Co. This post is based on a recent paper by Mr. Halem, Joseph E.

Finance 210

Finance Equity Marketability 210

Harvard Corporate Governance

MARCH 1, 2024

Bieber, Sarah Ghulamhussain, and Peter Liddle, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, on Monday, February 26, 2024 Tags: Clawbacks , Climate , Cybersecurity , ESG , Executive Compensation , Executive ownership , GAAP , Glass Lewis , Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. , Posted by Arthur B. Crozier, Gabrielle E. Wolf, and Jonathan L.

Treasury 100

Treasury Technology Equity 100

Harvard Corporate Governance

SEPTEMBER 1, 2023

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, September 1, 2023 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of August 25-31, 2023. SEC in Securities Enforcement Cases Posted by J.W.

Venture Capital Fund 201

Venture Capital Fund Equity 201

Harvard Corporate Governance

JULY 8, 2022

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, July 8, 2022 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of July 1-7, 2022. Kelsh, and Corey Perry, Sidley Austin LLP, on Friday, July 1, 2022. Posted by Sonia Gupta Barros, John P.

Capital Structure 201

Capital Structure Finance 201

Harvard Corporate Governance

APRIL 8, 2022

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, April 8, 2022 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of April 1-7, 2022. Lo (MIT Sloan), and Ruixun Zhang (Peking University), on Friday, April 1, 2022. Posted by Hester M.

Finance 210

Finance Banking Equity Technology 210

Harvard Corporate Governance

MAY 19, 2022

Posted by Robert Eccles (Oxford University), and Charlie Penner, on Thursday, May 19, 2022 Editor's Note: Robert G. Eccles is Visiting Professor of Management Practice at Oxford University Said Business School, and Charlie Penner is former head of impact engagement at JANA Partners and former head of active engagement at Engine No.

Equity 240

Equity Marketability Technology 240

Harvard Corporate Governance

NOVEMBER 14, 2022

To the contrary, Twitter’s leaders obtained from Musk, and fought hard to keep, large monetary gains for shareholders (a premium of about of $10 billion), as well as for the corporate leaders themselves (who together made a gain of over $1 billion from the deal).

Finance 268

Finance 268

Harvard Corporate Governance

AUGUST 19, 2022

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, August 19, 2022 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of August 12-18, 2022. Climate Disclosures: Not Quite as Easy as (Scope) 1-2-3. Should Your Company Go Private? On Index Investing.

Dividends 218

Dividends Equity Marketability 218

Harvard Corporate Governance

MAY 6, 2022

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, May 6, 2022 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of April 29-May 5, 2022. Posted by Aneil Kovvali (University of Chicago), on Friday, April 29, 2022. Stark Choices for Corporate Reform.

Capital Structure 210

Capital Structure Compliance 210

Harvard Corporate Governance

NOVEMBER 4, 2022

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, November 4, 2022 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 28-November 3, 2022. Posted by Aneil Kovvali (Indiana University Maurer School of Law) , on Monday, October 31, 2022. Crenshaw, U.S.

Banking 218

Banking Technology 218

Harvard Corporate Governance

DECEMBER 2, 2022

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, December 2, 2022 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of November 25-December 1, 2022. The Rise of Rule 10b5-1 Enforcement and How Companies Can Mitigate Risk of DOJ and SEC Actions.

Equity 189

Equity 189

Harvard Corporate Governance

OCTOBER 14, 2022

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, October 14, 2022 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 7-13, 2022. SEC charges executives with insider trading—10b5-1 plan provided no defense. DEI Initiatives under Attack by Activists.

Compliance 222

Compliance Equity Technology 222

Harvard Corporate Governance

APRIL 22, 2022

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, April 22, 2022 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of April 15-21, 2022. Life Sciences Companies. Ten Questions to Ask Before Joining a Public Company Board of Directors. federal courts.

Equity 210

Equity Marketability Technology 210

Harvard Corporate Governance

JULY 1, 2022

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, July 1, 2022 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of June 24-30, 2022. It Pays For Companies To Leave Russia. University of Pennsylvania), on Tuesday, June 28, 2022. Posted by Leo E.

Equity 100

Equity Marketability Technology 100

Brian DeChesare

DECEMBER 14, 2022

For example, if University A has sent 500 students into investment banking roles over the past 5 years, accounting for 10% of total IB hires in the country, and University B has only sent 50, University A is a “target school,” while University B is more of a “semi-target.”. In the U.S.,

Banking 52

Banking Finance Start-ups Corporate Finance 52

Reynolds Holding

NOVEMBER 26, 2023

Portfolio screening means that shareholders buy or sell shares to influence the cost of capital for companies. Shareholder engagement involves direct interactions with companies through dialogue, shareholder proposals, or voting. Yet, this debate misses that sustainable investors can go beyond exit or voice to influence companies.

Marketability 52

Marketability Market Capitalization Banking 52

Reynolds Holding

DECEMBER 19, 2022

Over the last two decades, the dramatic increase in institutional investors’ ownership of rival companies has raised questions about collusive corporate policies. [1] percent) firm-years feature at least one institutional director representing an institutional shareholder owning at least 1 percent of outstanding shares. Bebchuk, L.

Finance 64

Finance Banking Equity Marketability 64

Reynolds Holding

FEBRUARY 21, 2023

In recent years, an increasingly popular strategy among hedge fund activists has been to acquire seats on the boards of target companies. However, obtaining board representation has costs, which include the direct costs of getting board representation and the risk of staking one’s reputation on the company’s future performance.

Dividends 72

Dividends Marketability EBITDA Market Capitalization 72

Reynolds Holding

JUNE 14, 2023

1] During the 2022 election cycle, corporations and business groups spent over $4.1 4] In the last presidential election, estimates of expenditures from dark money groups exceeded $1 billion. [5] 1] During the 2022 election cycle, corporations and business groups spent over $4.1 billion on political lobbying. [2]

Treasury 59

Treasury Marketability 59

Reynolds Holding

OCTOBER 24, 2022

The sales of green bonds reached a monthly record of $32 billion in September 2020, bringing the market’s overall size to almost $1 trillion (Wall Street Journal, 2020). [1] Therefore, the market reaction to green bonds announcements mainly captures the stock market reaction to the announcements of a few major companies such as Tesla.

Net Present Value 59

Net Present Value Marketability Equity Finance 59

Harvard Corporate Governance

AUGUST 5, 2022

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, August 5, 2022 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of July 29-August 4, 2022. What Do Elevated Shareholder Expectations Mean for Large Company Boards and Compensation Programs?

Capital Structure 210

Capital Structure Dividends Corporate Finance Technology 210

Reynolds Holding

DECEMBER 10, 2023

As a capital allocation decision, share buybacks intersect all three of the main corporate finance activities of investing, financing, and dividends [1]. They have bought back when share prices were cheap and issued, usually to acquire other companies, when their shares are expensive.

Dividends 45

Dividends Total Shareholder Return Corporate Finance Finance 45

Reynolds Holding

SEPTEMBER 20, 2022

Onshore Chinese companies use KWDs to provide credit support to their overseas subsidiaries, through which the former issue international bonds indirectly. That is why it has maintained an outright ban on foreign investment in China’s internet industry while allowing Chinese internet companies to list overseas through VIEs.

Finance 105

Finance Marketability Banking Equity 105

Harvard Corporate Governance

MARCH 22, 2024

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, March 22, 2024 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of March 15-21, 2024 Earnings News and Over-the-Counter Markets Posted by Stefan J.

Compliance 100

Compliance Equity Marketability 100

Harvard Corporate Governance

JANUARY 6, 2023

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, January 6, 2023 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of December 30-January 5, 2023. How Companies Should Approach Shareholder Proposals This Proxy Season. Posted by Anita B. Allen, David A.

Compliance 189

Compliance Marketability Technology 189

Harvard Corporate Governance

DECEMBER 1, 2023

Stellmach, Adam Aderton and William L.

Equity 189

Equity Marketability 189

Harvard Corporate Governance

JULY 7, 2023

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, July 7, 2023 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of June 30-July 6, 2023.

Compliance 225

Compliance 225

Reynolds Holding

AUGUST 9, 2022

Eighty-one percent of DuPont shareholders approved a proposal requiring the company to disclose how much plastic it releases into the environment each year and to assess the effectiveness of DuPont’s pollution policies. In the above examples, shareholders seem to be pushing companies to do things that might reduce value.

Technology 142

Technology Finance Marketability 142

Harvard Corporate Governance

APRIL 1, 2022

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, April 1, 2022 Editor's Note: This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of March 25-31, 2022. Posted by Lev Menand (Columbia University), on Friday, March 25, 2022. Posted by Gary Gensler, U.S.

Banking 196

Banking Equity Marketability 196

Reynolds Holding

JULY 19, 2023

The Securities and Exchange Commission regulations on climate disclosure, first proposed in March 2022 and likely to be issued in final form in October 2023, [1] have drawn considerable controversy and face an uncertain fate in the inevitable litigation. [2] 15] Company reports would also have to be verified by qualified third-party auditors.

Marketability 75

Marketability 75

Reynolds Holding

MAY 1, 2023

On March 7, 2017, the eve of International Women’s Day, State Street Global Advisors initiated its “Fearless Girl” campaign, an effort to increase the number of female directors on the boards of its portfolio companies. [1] Other institutional investors took similar action.

Equity 104

Equity Firm Value 104

Reynolds Holding

APRIL 20, 2023

1] The average proportion of buybacks out of aggregate shareholder payouts in 2019-2021 was higher than the historical average during 2005-2019 in the U.S. 1] The average proportion of buybacks out of aggregate shareholder payouts in 2019-2021 was higher than the historical average during 2005-2019 in the U.S. and Europe. [2]

Marketability 72

Marketability Equity 72

Reynolds Holding

MAY 22, 2022

The ownership threshold for triggering a pill is typically 10-15 percent of a company’s stock for non-passive investors, no matter the size of the company. Exhibit 1 details the trigger thresholds for U.S. Exhibit 1 details the trigger thresholds for U.S. Exhibit 1: Trigger Thresholds for U.S. and Canadian Pills.

Market Capitalization 75

Market Capitalization Marketability Equity 75