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Secret and Overt Information Acquisition in Financial Markets

Harvard Corporate Governance

Site visits are considered costly and significant activities for investors to acquire information. Investors may have incentives to keep secret these activities to maintain their trading advantage over the market. -based supplier of premium building products.

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Separating Ownership and Information

Harvard Corporate Governance

Our paper Separating Ownership and Information , forthcoming in the American Economic Review , provides a new perspective on the separation of ownership and control—the fundamental problem in corporate governance according to classical theories (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976).

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Accounting Information and Risk Shifting with Asymmetrically Informed Creditors

Harvard Corporate Governance

fair value accounting) affect equity markets, it remains largely unexplored in debt markets. While this question has received much attention in the aftermath of the recent financial crises, often directed at the issue of how particular accounting choices (e.g.,

Banking 109
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Know Your Customer: Informed Trading by Banks

Harvard Corporate Governance

In particular, universal banks could use borrowers’ confidential information when selling securities to investors or trading in capital markets. Despite the persisting political and scholarly debate, it is surprising how little we know about banks’ use of private information and banks’ proprietary trading in general.

Banking 230
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Do Companies Redact Material Information From Confidential SEC Filings? Evidence From the FAST Act

Harvard Corporate Governance

Because some material contracts contain proprietary information, firms can redact specific information from material contracts so long as the redacted information 1) would cause competitive harm if disclosed and 2) is immaterial to investors. un-redactions). more…).

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Indexing and the Incorporation of Exogenous Information Shocks to Stock Prices

Harvard Corporate Governance

This study presents direct evidence that increased indexing impairs the flow of information into stock prices. We rely on currency shocks only because they are relatively simple to measure and quantify, so our findings suggest information flow impairment in general. more…)

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Dirty Air and Green Investments: The Impact of Pollution Information on Portfolio Allocations

Harvard Corporate Governance

discussed on the Forum here ) by Scott Hirst, Kobi Kastiel, and Tamar Kricheli-Katz; and Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value (discussed on the Forum here ) by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; How Much Do Investors Care about Social Responsibility? more…)