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Good and Bad CEOs

Harvard Corporate Governance

To make progress on this question, our paper “ Good and Bad CEOs ” analyzes changes in firm value, performance, and behavior caused by deaths of incumbent CEOs. Unlike other CEO turnovers, most CEO deaths are randomly allocated to firms and are not a decision made by the board of directors.

Finance 237
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Do Individual Directors Matter?

Reynolds Holding

A fundamental question in corporate governance research is whether the board of directors affects firm value. Some argue that directors contribute no additional value to the firm and may even lower its value if they act only as a rubber stamp on the CEO’s decisions. percent of variation in DSQ.

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Do Meritless Whistleblower Claims Hurt Companies and Shareholders?

Reynolds Holding

Further, regardless of their merit, whistleblower claims may alert auditors and directors to the risk of potential misconduct, prompting them to spend more effort monitoring the firm’s financial reporting. Consistent with prior literature, we find a negative effect of meritorious whistleblower claims on firm value.

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How Companies and the Market Respond to the Issuance of Green Bonds

Reynolds Holding

This possibility was first raised by Bhagat and Hubbard (2022) in their analysis of Nobel laureate Milton Friedman’s long-term firm value maximization hypothesis vis-à-vis the Business Roundtable’s stakeholder paradigm. We document no change in carbon emissions after the announcement.

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The Innovation and Reporting Consequences of Financial Regulation for Young Life-Cycle Firms

Reynolds Holding

We also predict that young life-cycle firms are less likely to improve financial reporting as a result of financial regulation because a significant portion of young life-cycle firmsvalue stems from intangible assets that are not recorded or disclosed in financial statements under current accounting rules. 2007, Iliev 2010).

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Pay for Prudence

Reynolds Holding

We contribute to this debate by documenting the extent to which bankers’ pay contains prudence-related targets, the association between those targets and other incentives, and how the targets affect future bank risk-taking. Using our novel dataset, we document that PfP has existed since the beginning of our sample period in 2001.​

Banking 52
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Does the Market Misprice Companies’ “Strategic Alternatives” Announcements?

Reynolds Holding

However, academic researchers and investment professionals have documented instances where news does predict future stock returns, providing an opportunity to understand investors’ actual behavior, which is not always rational and efficient. Returns are adjusted for firm size and book-to-market of equity.