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Disloyal Managers and Shareholders’ Wealth

Harvard Corporate Governance

Fich (Drexel University), Jarrad Harford (University of Washington), and Anh L. Tran is a Professor of Finance at City University of London Bayes School of Business. Posted by Elierzer M. This post is based on their article forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies. discussed on the Forum here ) by Holger Spamann.

Finance 243
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Weekly Roundup: May 26-June 1, 2023

Harvard Corporate Governance

Eccles (Oxford University) and Eli Lehrer (R Street Institute), on Monday, May 29, 2023 Tags: anti-ESG , Climate change , ESG , Fiduciary duties , legislation , Monetary policy Disloyal Managers and Shareholders’ Wealth Posted by Eliezer M. Fich (Drexel University), Jarrad Harford (University of Washington), and Anh L.

Equity 227
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Private Equity’s Neglected Pre-History: A Trans-Atlantic Perspective

Reynolds Holding

The most notable example of this was Morgan’s personal funding of Thomas Edison’s pioneering Electric Light Company, in 1878, which included providing 50 percent of the principal capital for the construction of a new power station for the company in New York. I further show how the common perception of private equity as a purely U.S.

Equity 59
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The Blurring Lines between Private and Public Ownership

Reynolds Holding

Public versus private status is a common point of differentiation among companies and can determine, for example, how they are regulated and who can invest in them. Yet many private companies increasingly resemble their public counterparts. Over time, a portion of these companies lose this controlled status.

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What Dodd-Frank Tells Us About the Impact of Risk Oversight Functions on Bank Risk

Reynolds Holding

2] We use data on bank holding companies and financial holding companies from 2005 to 2018. This post comes to us from Lakshmi Balasubramanyan at Case Western Reserve University’s Weatherhead School of Management, Naveen D. Daniel at Drexel University, Joseph G.

Banking 52
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Why Do Companies Going Public Choose Controversial Governance Structures, and Why Do Investors Let Them?

Reynolds Holding

While almost 60 percent of S&P 1500 companies had classified boards in the 1990s, only 35 percent had them in 2017. The percentage of companies with dual class shares has also dropped, from 12 percent of the S&P 1500 in the 1990s to 7 percent in 2017. Recommendations of ISS.

Equity 49
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Transfer Traps: Considerations for Dual-Class Companies Contemplating M&A Transactions

Cooley M&A

The rise of founder-led, venture capital-backed companies in recent years has coincided with a surge of companies implementing dual-class share structures in connection with their initial public offerings. Prominent dual-class companies include Alphabet, Meta Platforms, Snap and Lyft.

Equity 59