Reynolds Holding

OCTOBER 27, 2022

For example, over the last 10 years, activist shareholders and institutional investors have demanded more of a voice in company decisions. Whether shareholder proxies are confidential. Accountability and Listing Standards Comm., It is time for the NYSE to revisit its rule to improve the effectiveness of CGGs. Stock Exch.

49

49

Harvard Corporate Governance

OCTOBER 28, 2022

Northway, explained in an 8-0 opinion that a fact is “material” if there is “a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote,” and where the disclosure of would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as “having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” [9]

Banking 203

Banking Enterprise Value Marketability Compliance 203

Reynolds Holding

MAY 15, 2022

The shareholder proposal has long been an effective tool for shareholders to bring emerging corporate governance issues to the attention of a company’s board of directors, its managers, and their fellow shareholders. At the same time, shareholder proposals are controversial.

78

78

Reynolds Holding

JUNE 27, 2023

Darla led the Society’s efforts on numerous topics related to shareholders and corporate governance. One of those topics is rule 14a-8 [1] and shareholder proposals, a subject on which many SEC commissioners have provided their views over the years and, indeed, decades. [2] Staff Legal Bulletin No. Staff Legal Bulletin No.

Corporate Finance 45

Corporate Finance Marketability Finance Start-ups 45

Reynolds Holding

JULY 17, 2022

Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue , 62 L. & 325, 351 (1987) (“The Business Roundtable virulently objected. to calling the Corporate Governance project a Restatement.”); Robert B. & Contemp. 15] Restatement at x. [16] Model Business Corporation Act v (rev.

137

137

Reynolds Holding

JUNE 16, 2022

40] Then, shareholders proposals in this area drew “an average of from 2% to 3% of the vote;” now, they attract more than ten times that level of shareholder support. [41]. 329, 340-42 (2010) (describing the limits of collective action by shareholders). [28] 25,638, 25,639 n.17 11380 (March 16, 1982). [12] 8, 2010). [13]

Corporate Finance 52

Corporate Finance Finance Compliance Marketability 52