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Did SB21’s Changes to Delaware Corporate Law Harm Shareholders?

Reynolds Holding

We also examined whether DE Companies underperformed Non-DE Companies on specific dates with notable events related to SB21. [5] This simple analysis does not support the perspective that the market viewed the passage of SB21 as negative for shareholders of DE-incorporated companies. No Evidence that SB21 Has Hurt Shareholders.

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Compulsion No, Opportunity Yes in the Delaware Law of Externalities

Reynolds Holding

Moreover, the success of the Google IPO in 2004 provided market validation for the entrepreneurs use of dual class common stock as a way of retaining control while retaining considerably less than 50 percent of the cash flow rights of the public company. Derivative. Kahan and Roc k, 48 J. 101, 103-04 (2023). [18] 19] See Anna L.