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Deregulation and Board Policies: Evidence from Performance Measures Used in Bank CEO Turnover Decisions

Harvard Corporate Governance

In contrast, most variation in CEO wealth stems from changes in the value of stock and option holdings, so the incentives arising from the CEO’s compensation are partly delegated to the equity markets (Hall and Liebman 1998; Edmans, Gabaix, and Jenter 2017).

Banking 202
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Pay for Prudence

Reynolds Holding

As in other industries, a bank’s shareholders and board of directors provide incentives for management to maximize firm value. While bank shareholders may prefer risky actions that are likely correlated with increases in shareholder value, they must also gauge the likelihood of regulatory intervention. Coles et al.

Banking 52
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ESG Investing Clearly Serves Pecuniary Interests

Reynolds Holding

In July, 2017, the stock of NYSE-traded Tahoe Resources dropped 33 percent when the Supreme Court of Guatemala suspended its license to operate the world’s third-largest silver mine. [14] Mining.com, July 6, 2017. Filed by: Shin Imai, Justice and Corporate Accountability Project, May 8, 2017. 3°C by 2100. [25] Available here. [14]

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What the Rise of Indexing Means for Corporate Governance

Reynolds Holding

Domestic passive funds and ETFs now manage more than half of all assets under management (AUM) of domestic equity mutual funds and ETFs, and the Big Three passive fund managers (BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard) cast over a quarter of the votes in S&P 500 companies. Fahlenbrach (2017). Michaely, and M.C. Ringgenberg (2022).

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The Uncertain Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting Corporate Diversity

Reynolds Holding

On March 7, 2017, the eve of International Women’s Day, State Street Global Advisors initiated its “Fearless Girl” campaign, an effort to increase the number of female directors on the boards of its portfolio companies. [1] 13, 2017), [link] [3] See Todd A. Gormley, Vishal K. Gupta, David A. Matsa, Sandra C.

Equity 104
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Why Do Companies Going Public Choose Controversial Governance Structures, and Why Do Investors Let Them?

Reynolds Holding

Over the past three decades, there has been increasing concern about how corporate governance structures such as classified boards and dual class stock entrench managers, reduce director effectiveness, and reduce firm value. Likely as a result, mature firms have increasingly eliminated these structures.

Equity 49
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Boardroom Gender-Diversity Reforms and Institutional Monitoring

Reynolds Holding

While investors play a critical role in engaging with company boards and are increasingly focused on social equity, the evidence is scant on how these reforms affect investors’ monitoring role. This gap also contrasts with regulators’ reliance on investors to help ensure firms’ faithful implementation of the reforms. mutual funds).